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Abstract: In recent decades the study of cognitive processes has been influenced by two tendencies: legitimation 
of several forms and levels of study and the attempt of multidisciplinary integration. The first had great importance 
in the second half of the 20th century, when research lines in cognitive psychology and neuroscience were 
strengthened. In this sense, Marr’s three levels of analysis (computational, algorithmic, and implementation) are 
one way to structure the study of cognitive processes. The second tendency is more recent and, supported by 
the first one, seeks to deepen the understanding of cognitive processes in their different scales and to integrate 
several paradigms of studies in order to reach theoretical consilience. This article aims to introduce computational 
neuroscience and its possible contributions to cognitive psychology, articulating, through Marr’s three levels, a 
theoretical basis that explains the role of each of the disciplines and their possible interactions.
Keywords: cognition, computational neuroscience, memory, learning, vision.
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Introduction
The seminars that helped shape research in 
cognitive science were held around half a century ago. 
In these seminars, Noam Chomsky (1928-present) 
argued that, as a starting point, models of cognition 
and behavior should be dissociated from physiological 
parameters or other physical causes, even though these 
should support hypotheses raised by cognitive models at 
a later stage (see Chomsky, 2009 for a compilation of the 
seminars). This two-stage movement – abstract models 
and search for biological support – prevents technical 
limitations from affecting the creation of models and 
consequent hypotheses. Since then, thanks to theoretical 
and technological advances in neuroscience, abstract 
models generated by cognitive psychologists can seek 
support in physiological mechanisms, gaining theoretical 
strength. That interaction allows abstract considerations 
about human cognition and behavior to be instantiated, 
taking into account the space-time restrictions imposed 
by the nervous system.
Parallel to the development of cognitive science, 
computational neuroscience studies started to be 
conducted in an attempt to understand the mechanisms 
of codification and communication used by neural circuits 
of the nervous system. Today, research advances in this 
area allow us to build a more solid bridge that possibly 
connects the different models of cognition and behavior 
to the corresponding neural circuits (Eliasmith, 2007), 
contributing to the study of physical and biological bases 
of human cognition.
This article aims to introduce computational 
neuroscience and its possible contributions to cognitive 
psychology, by articulating the theoretical structure 
proposed by David Marr (Marr, 1982) with the study 
of cognitive processes through several disciplines. 
Specifically, this study will seek to include underlying 
studies of cognitive psychology and neural circuits to 
such cognitive processes, outlining the challenges and 
successes of such articulation. To that purpose, we will 
present examples from sensory neuroscience studies in 
order to build a solid relationship between neural dynamics 
and cognitive processes as a whole. This way, we hope 
to contribute to the coordinated insertion of psychology 
into the fertile multidisciplinary approach that is present 
in both cognitive science and neuroscience.
Philosophical bases for the study of 
cognition 
Although in ancient times studies were conducted 
to analyze the processes that allowed man to gain 
knowledge, think and solve problems, in many ancient 
civilizations, including the Greeks, the brain was not 
considered responsible for mental functions. Reason 
(‘ratio’) was considered part of the soul and, as such, 
resided in the heart, despite the belief of philosophers 
like Democritus (460-370 BC) and Plato (429-348 BC) 
that the head would be somehow related to the intellect 
(Finger, 1994). Even Aristotle (384-322 BC), one of the 
first to study the psychological aspects of humans, such 
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as dreams, perception and memory, adhered to the theory 
of cardiocentrism, attributing to the brain the function of 
controlling the temperature of the heart (Clarke, 1963).
In modern times, René Descartes (1596-1650) 
proposed the distinction between the thinking substance 
(res cogitans) and the extended substance (res extensa), 
dissociating the body from the mind (Descartes, 
1637/2008a, 1641/2008b). Such vision became known 
as ‘dualism.’ Although Cartesian thought was contested 
in its own time due to inconsistencies about mind-body 
integration (for review, see Finger, 1994), it still permeates 
several areas of psychology, which advocate the separation 
of mind and brain in spite of substantial clinical evidence 
pointing to a prominent role not only of the brain, but also 
of the rest of the body, in the construction of what we call 
‘self’ (Damasio, 1994).
A very significant contribution of Descartes to 
philosophy and science in general, however, comes from his 
method of systematically obtaining knowledge (Descartes, 
1637/2008a). The four premises of the Cartesian method, 
which constitute the structural basis of modern science, 
are: (i) to accept only that which is true; (ii) to divide 
problems into manageable parts; (iii) to start from the 
simplest questions before rising to more complex ones; 
(iv) to review frequently what is already known, such as 
to be able to cover the whole argument. These premises 
are currently embedded in common sense (Dutra, 2010) 
and almost all methods applied to cognition studies that 
will be discussed in the following sessions use them, even 
if their results contradict Cartesian dualism.
David Hume (1711-1776), when studying human 
understanding and, in particular, inductive processes 
(generalizations), highlighted that there is no purely 
logical substrate for inductive inferences. This means 
that one cannot generalize knowledge from particular 
events. Using the classic example, Hume says that there is 
nothing that ensures sunrise, even though it has occurred 
every day for a long time. One predicts this event due to 
its recurrence, which implies habituation of the intellect 
(Hume, 1748/1975). The critical point in Hume’s argument 
is that induction is fundamentally different from deduction 
(in which correct assumptions lead to correct conclusions), 
and requires memory and predictability, which are prone 
to error. Although Hume is best known for the problem 
he raised rather than for the solution he found for it, 
his importance is reflected by his influence on other 
great names in epistemology such as Kant and Popper 
(Popper, 1934/2013, 2010).
Another classic work on human cognition was 
written by Kant, who proposed, in a true tour de force, 
a model of human intellect that today still influences 
cognitive psychology (Kant, 1783/2014). His work is 
regarded in the philosophical field as one of the greatest 
analysis of the human intellect. It presents and highlights 
three different intellectual faculties which are sharply 
detailed: sensitivity, which processes the reception 
of objects of the world (present in time and space); 
understanding, which applies categories and concepts to 
the objects processed by sensitivity; and reason, which 
modulates understanding, allowing its good or bad use, 
which translates, for the author, into uses in or out of the 
possible experience (Dutra, 2010).
Until the advent of psychology as a scientific area, 
the philosophical approach prevailed in the study of how 
human beings think. Many current research lines still 
address philosophical problems: Cartesian dualism is 
notably the most frequent one. More recently, models that 
actively seek to incorporate cognition into the organism 
and the organism into the environment are predominant 
in the field of cognitive science and neuroscience (for 
a review, refer to Damasio, 1994). This movement 
started in the 1940s with James J. Gibson (1904-1979) 
and his ecological psychology, which sought to correlate 
perceptual phenomena and environmental characteristics 
in an attempt to fill gaps left by movements such as Gestalt 
(Jenkins, 2008). Gibson incorporated Darwinian concepts 
by stating that the environment (or “niche”) sets limits 
and opportunities for the organism, in response to which 
perception occurs (Gibson, 1950; Jenkins, 2008).
Since then, several philosophical theories of similar 
nature have directly opposed Cartesian dualism, partly 
supported by Gibson’s ideas; the theories gathered under 
the name ‘embodied cognition’ (Varela, Thompson, & 
Rosch, 1991; Wilson & Foglia, 2015) are particularly 
important for the subjects addressed here. The central 
idea of several of these theories is ‘embodiment’: the body 
and its biological restrictions would determine cognitive 
processing to some extent (Varela et al., 1991). One current 
related to ‘embodied cognition’ is enactivism, whose 
main argument is that perception – and, consequently, 
cognition – emerges from the interaction between the 
organism and the environment, as the subject actively 
participates in his perceptual construction by acting on 
the environment (Gangopadhyay & Kiverstein, 2009). In 
this interpretation, cognition would therefore be the result 
of sensory and motor activity of the individual onto the 
real world (Wilson & Foglia, 2015).
Cognition is a core concept in the history of 
psychological currents and in the development of 
psychology in the 20th century (Benjafield, 1997; 
Neisser, 1967). By moving away from the behaviorist 
orientation, which focused on studying the organism 
through environmental manipulations, the first research 
lines of cognitive psychology struggled to eliminate 
any effect of the environment in cognition other than 
the stimulus itself. In the case of visual perception, for 
example, one believed before Gibson in a linear model that 
began with the conversion of an environmental stimulus 
into an icon by the retina, and proceeded with increasingly 
complex processing stages without new interference of the 
environment (Neisser, 1967). In this sense, Gibson was 
one of the pioneers in attempting to reconcile cognitive 
psychology and the constant effect of the environment 
on cognitive processes (Benjafield, 1997). Several other 
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approaches that try to relate cognitive processes to the 
environment come from his work.
The following sections will address methodologies 
that aim to integrate the mind, as a research topic of 
psychology, and the brain, as a theme that belongs to 
the field of neurophysiology (Barlow, 1972). Despite the 
importance of the philosophical themes discussed so 
far, current studies of cognition also include seemingly 
more reductionist and strongly empirical approaches. 
Therefore, much of the synthetic elegance of the 
philosophical models of cognition presented here will 
be replaced with the simplicity of analytical studies in 
order to broaden the knowledge of specific cognitive 
characteristics. With this idea in mind, we will highlight 
the usefulness of computational neuroscience in the 
integration between psychological phenomena and 
physiological mechanisms..
More recent approaches in the study of 
cognition
Today, cognitive science addresses cognition as 
a result of information extraction and processing (for 
an overview, refer to Benjafield, 1997). Information can 
be defined in a number of ways; broadly speaking, it 
is anything that reduces the uncertainty regarding an 
event (Neisser, 1967). This way, information is obtained 
whenever a question is answered, since it reduced the 
existing uncertainty.
Although this definition of cognition as information 
processing finds little opposition and lies at the heart of 
the 20th cognitive revolution (Neisser, 1967), it should be 
emphasized that definitions in the cognitive field, as they 
are not palpable or objective, should also take specific 
aspects into account. In most sciences, for example, 
concepts involve entities that can be either ‘part of’ or ‘a 
type of’ something, without overlapping categories. One 
can thus say that ‘the heart is a type of organ,’ but not that 
‘the organ is part of the heart’. In many concepts about 
cognition, however, there is overlap of categories; one can 
both say that ‘problem solving is a type of reasoning’ and 
‘reasoning is part of problem solving’ (Benjafield, 1997). 
Therefore, it should be noted that the study of cognition 
follows specific rules due to the inherent complexity 
of defining concepts that are not directly related to a 
palpable object.
Most theoretical studies of cognitive psychology, 
as a consequence, deal with abstract models of cognition, 
which do not have spatial and temporal restrictions. Despite 
that, the number of studies that seek out a relation between 
cognitive processes and their neuroanatomic correlates 
has increased, such as those using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (Barch et al., 2013; Berman, Jonides, 
& Nee, 2006; Fornito, Zalesky, & Breakspear, 2015; Van 
Essen et al., 2013). In fact, much of the effort in the field of 
neuropsychology contributes to the understanding of such 
correlates, which have practical application in psychiatric 
diagnoses and psychological treatments (for a discussion, 
refer to Williams, 2016; Williams et al., 2016). In this 
type of approach, the concept of cognition is adapted to 
the spatial restrictions imposed by the anatomy of the 
nervous system.
In parallel to neuropsychology, computational 
neuroscience searches for morphofunctional correlates 
for cognition that are equally important, albeit with a less 
immediate practical effect: these aim to understand how 
cognitive processes are related to the functioning of neural 
circuits and, more precisely, how each neuron contributes 
to the global phenomenon of cognition (Barlow, 1972). The 
understanding of this relation more accurately defines the 
temporal restrictions of cognitive processes. The general 
question is clear: how do such circuits lead to cognition? 
To answer this question, contributions from areas such 
as physiology and computer science must be taken into 
account (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992).
While physiological studies have a history dating 
back centuries, computer science was consolidated in the 
20th century as a discipline distinct from mathematics 
(Brookshear, 2003; Newell & Simon, 1976). In a short 
time, theoretical and technological advances in both 
computer science and neuroscience in general allowed 
the analogy between the nervous system and a computer, 
that is, a system that processes information. Since then, 
computational models of neural functioning have been 
developed with different degrees of abstraction, seeking to 
explain the computational purpose of some neural property 
and, in many cases, its consequence in cognitive terms 
(Korn & Faber, 2005; Langley, Laird, & Rogers, 2009).
Computational studies will be explained in more 
detail in the following sections, as well as their importance 
to understand cognitive processes. It should be noted 
that the results obtained in general neuroscience and in 
computational neuroscience are very incipient for the 
ultimate goal of understanding how the brain represents 
and computes stimuli. However, the study of neural 
circuits is already proving useful for obtaining robust 
and detailed diagnoses of mental disorders (Williams, 
2016; Williams et al., 2016), confirming its practical 
validity. In particular, neural computation studies are 
very far from a revolutionary impact given the classic 
problems of Psychology, which attempt to understand the 
complexity of the human being through several theoretical 
orientations. Rather, computational studies are fertile 
contributions to that still highly qualitative and theoretical 
task of explaining the interactions of human beings with 
their environment.
In the specific case of visual processing, there is 
still a long way to experimentally show how a network 
of complex neural interactions can originate a percept 
(Barlow, 1972). The sole difficulty of these studies makes 
the formulation of hypotheses and theories so important. 
Thus, Luria’s contribution to neuropsychology is largely 
due to his hierarchical model of the functional units of 
the brain (Luria, 1973).
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Likewise, the studies conducted by Donald Olding 
Hebb (1904-1985) about the neural basis of memory and 
learning had a major impact on neuroscience in general 
(Hebb, 1944/2002). Hebb organized his ideas into 
three premises: (i) the first proposes that two neurons 
undergo metabolic and/or structural alterations when 
their activation patterns are correlated, for facilitation 
of transmission between these neurons; (ii) the second 
proposes that neurons that have correlated activities form 
a ‘cell assembly’ that have functional connection; (iii) 
the third presents a temporally concatenated activation 
of several cell assemblies, called ‘phase sequence,’ just 
as the flow of thought itself (Crick & Koch, 1990; Hebb, 
1944/2002). Since then, many experimental and theoretical 
studies have confirmed, revised, and expanded the largely 
theoretical and qualitative work performed by Hebb 
(Bliss & Lomo, 1973; Brown, Kairiss, & Keenan, 1990; 
Caporale & Dan, 2008; Crick & Koch, 1990; Kolb, 2003; 
Lechner & Byrne, 1998).
The computational brain
It has been a fertile and heuristic approach to 
consider the nervous system a system that computes 
information (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1988, 1992; 
Eliasmith, 2007). To perform its operations, the nervous 
system has to convert the signals from the environment 
into its own internal code, which is structured into 
changes in the electrical potential of neurons through 
ionic flows. In the visual system, photoreceptors in the 
retina convert the luminous signal into an electric signal: 
a photon is thus ‘computed.’ However, visual information 
processing is complex, even in its early stages; this fact is 
very clear when considering that although photoreceptors 
compute photons, human beings see much more complex 
visual entities. Indeed, an individual is unable to tell 
the amount of photons present in things he sees (Field, 
Sampath, & Rieke, 2005; Hecht, Shlaer, & Pirenne, 1942).
In this sense, the proposal of a ‘computational brain’ 
should precisely establish the nature of the computation 
performed by the nervous system. Churchland and 
Sejnowski (1992) reformulate this question as follows: 
“When can a physical system be called a computer?” 
Among cautious considerations, the question is answered 
by indicating that a computer is a system that receives 
one type of signal (a set of data), which is converted and 
represented by means of a code; it then performs finite 
and definite operations related to that code, changing its 
physical configurations, and at the end, it generates a result 
that can be associated with the original signal.
This premise creates a research area that deals with 
the complexity of the nervous system and its computations. 
As it is natural of any biological system, several levels of 
analysis are necessary to characterize some process that 
occurs in the nervous system. In a biological approach, cell 
biology, physiology, and anatomy investigate the function 
and structure of the system of interest at different levels. 
In a computational approach, the division of the studied 
system in levels is also advisable in order to increase 
clarity. The following section presents the levels of analysis 
proposed by David Marr (1945-1980), which organize 
the computational study of the brain and can, in a sense, 
encompass general cognitive models. 
Marr’s three levels of analysis
As a way of systematizing how systems that process 
information can be understood, Marr (1982) used the 
visual system as a model in a computational paradigm 
and proposed that the complete characterization of this 
system would take place at three levels: computational, 
algorithmic, and implementational. These levels were 
originally created to formalize the different tactics for 
the study of a system that processes information, such 
as the nervous system, and allow approaches that focus 
on the most abstract part of this system: the information 
itself (Marr & Poggio, 1976). These three levels proposed 
by Marr, discussed in detail below, are still used in 
neuroscience today (Hardcastle & Hardcastle, 2015; 
Johnson, 2016; Peebles & Cooper, 2015).
The computational level. This level basically 
refers to the overall function of the system being studied 
(vision, hearing, decision making, etc.). Neural processes 
and routines that occur continuously in the nervous 
system play a role in the interaction of the organism 
with the environment. At every moment, we observe 
the surroundings and our eyes focus on a small sample 
of visual possibilities. Visual focus itself, as well as its 
constant changes, requires the control of conscious or 
unconscious attentional and cognitive processes (Dehaene 
& Naccache, 2001), and of routines for eye and neck muscle 
adjustment (Land, 2006; Westheimer & Blair, 1975). A 
characterization of these phenomena at the computational 
level has to consider the visual tasks performed and the 
information extracted from such tasks. 
Thus, the task of the visual system is not to count 
and transmit the number of photons that fall into each 
photoreceptor at every moment. Rather, much of what 
is done in the early stages of visual processing is the 
evaluation of contrast, that is, of differences in luminance 
of one portion of the visual scene in relation to the other 
(for a discussion, refer to Barlow, 1972). From this initial 
information, secondary and integrative visual circuits in 
the brain build an analysis of the environment, which is 
sent to volitional and motor centers for attentional decision 
making and voluntary execution of ocular movements. 
Therefore, in the visual system, understanding the type 
of extracted information is essential to understanding the 
task and function of visual processes (Cavanagh, 2011; 
Pinker, 1985).
The algorithmic level. This level refers to the modus 
operandi of the studied system, that is, what the system 
does to fulfill its function. In general, an algorithm is 
defined in computational science as a deterministic and 
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finite method (Blass & Gurevich, 2003) whose purpose 
is to solve an explicit problem. An algorithm outlines 
clearly and comprehensively all computational stages 
that should take place to conclude a specified task. The 
algorithmic characterization of the nervous system should 
thus take into account the structuring and methodology 
of all computational stages. In the visual system, this 
algorithmic characterization is strongly present in studies 
that aim to understand how different cells in the retina 
or brain preferentially respond to different characteristics 
of visual stimulus (Gollisch & Meister, 2010; Hubel & 
Wiesel, 1963; Masland, 2012a).
The implementational level, lastly, refers to the 
physical structures involved in a certain function. They 
process the algorithms required to perform the tasks 
of that system. As a physical entity, any system that 
processes information should be instantiated in time 
and space. For example, a digital computer is usually 
implemented such as to provide a processing unit and 
a memory unit. Understanding how the input of data 
influences the physical states of the processor and of 
the memory in this computer means understanding how 
the computer physically implements the algorithms that 
should be executed to continue that computation. This, in 
turn, enables the comprehension of computer structures 
and the relationship between them. In the visual system, 
understanding the implementational level is an essential 
part of the studies that aim to understand the nervous 
system structure through, for example, morphological 
analyses (Masland, 2011, 2012a).
Marr’s levels in the study of cognition
At a first glance, the models generated by 
cognitive psychology seem to comfortably fit Marr’s 
computational level, since they emphasize function without 
considering structure. However, the complete reduction 
is problematic, because characterizations of cognitive 
psychology have different scopes and methodologies from 
the disciplines that study information processing in a 
quantitative paradigm. The definition of ‘computing’ is 
for Marr much more mathematical than qualitative: much 
of his effort, for example, was employed in the study of 
the implications of signal-to-noise ratio for information 
processing (Marr, 1982).
In fact, Marr’s approach was widely criticized 
by his contemporaries. Its own emergence occurred in 
opposition to Gibson’s theory of ecological perception 
(Gibson, 1950, 1986), although incorporating several of 
Gibson’s concepts at the computational level (Warren, 
2012). While for Gibson perception aims ultimately to make 
contact with the outside by collecting information about 
it, for Marr the main function of perception is to create an 
inner representation of the external world (Warren, 2012). 
From the point of view of the enactivist studies of cognition 
that had a significant impact on contemporary cognitive 
psychology, it is possible to consider that Marr’s theory 
served as a counterpoint to Gibson’s proposal and somehow 
allowed an improvement of an ecological approach to 
cognitive processes (Gangopadhyay & Kiverstein, 2009).
Thus, despite criticism, Marr’s computational 
approach to cognition influenced many cognitive 
psychology currents. In fact, it is the only one among 
today’s most influential theories about visual perception 
(which includes Gestalt and ecological perception) that 
offers the possibility of formal modeling (Richards, 2012). 
One of the most interesting aspects of the computational 
approach is that, as Marr (1982) points out, it is easier and 
more instructive to understand an algorithm knowing 
which computation it performs than by analyzing its 
physical instantiation only (in his own words, “it is 
impossible to understand the flight of birds only by 
observing their feathers”).
As there is some degree of independence between 
the levels, several algorithms can potentially perform a 
given computation process, and these algorithms can in 
turn be implemented in different ways. Therefore, it is 
possible to analyze each level in a relatively independent 
way. However, a broad understanding of the studied 
systems is only possible through research strategies that 
perform analysis at all levels.
Unlike the models of cognitive psychology, the 
studies on neural circuits strongly embrace the algorithmic 
and implementational levels. This is largely due to the 
formulation and the smaller scale of the problems that 
such studies attempt to solve. As it will become clear in 
the next section, the advances in understanding sensory 
systems ensured by such studies are, in fact, much of the 
scientific knowledge obtained in the area, especially when 
it comes to the study of vision (Cavanagh, 2011). We will 
next address the types of studies that can be performed 
at the computational level taking into account the degree 
of space-time abstraction and physical-mathematical 
restrictions adopted by the models of cognitive psychology 
and computational neuroscience.
The visual system as a model for the study 
of cognition
Among the tasks performed by the nervous system, 
those that are best understood take place in the first stages 
of sensory processing (Rodieck, 1998). Of all the senses, 
only vision has two characteristics that help understand 
the usefulness of a computational basis for cognition. First, 
visual information is fully processed in the central nervous 
system, as opposed to other sensory modalities (Ames & 
Nesbett, 1981). It places vision closer to complex cognitive 
tasks performed to a large extent without the participation 
of the peripheral nervous system (Cavanagh, 2011). The 
second point is that vision one of the best characterized 
senses; the large number of studies in the area allows 
theoretical consilience, resulting in greater stringency in 
the proposals that seek to integrate the knowledge acquired 
within different research paradigms. Ergo, a computational 
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basis for vision and visual cognitions is more likely to 
be refuted or corroborated (Cavanagh, 2011; Marr, 1982; 
Torben-Nielsen & Stiefel, 2010).
A relevant description of vision should include 
the two major tasks performed by the visual system: 
measurement and inference (Cavanagh, 2011; Marr, 
1982; Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). Measurement refers 
to the extraction of visual information, taking the 
abundant types of visual neurons into account (there 
are more than sixty types only in the retina, refer to 
Masland, 2012a), which have distinct receptive fields 
optimized to extract different information from the 
visual field. In this sense, computational neuroscience 
can help understanding the visual system at all three 
levels of Marr, by presenting models that contribute to 
the comprehension of visual measurement. For example, 
many studies use computational models to understand 
the absorption of photons by photoreceptors at very low 
light levels (Hamer, Nicholas, Tranchina, Liebman, & 
Lamb, 2003; Lamb & Pugh, 2006; Lyubarsky & Pugh, 
1996), or to analyze the integration of these absorptions 
by post-receptoral neurons (Berntson, Smith, & Taylor, 
2004; Lipin, Smith, & Taylor, 2010).
There are many studies of vision at the neuronal level 
that combine morphology, physiology, and computational 
modeling techniques to investigate how retinal amacrine 
cells generate direction selectivity in their post-synaptic 
partners (Masland, 2012b; Taylor & Smith, 2012; Tukker, 
Taylor, & Smith, 2004). Although the morphological and 
electrophysiological evidence provides a general explanation 
of the phenomenon (Taylor, He, Levick, & Vaney, 2000; 
Taylor & Smith, 2012), only the computational model 
allows a richer characterization of predictive, and not only 
descriptive, character (Stuart, Spruston, & Häusser, 2007).
The other important task performed by the visual 
system is inference, which is related to processes of 
percept classification, such as the separation of figure 
from background, plus a number of processes related to 
categorization, whose complexity is still an obstacle to 
obtaining non-speculative knowledge close to a neuronal 
implementation. In this sense, inference is almost exclusive 
to psychology and fundamentally characterized at 
Marr’s computational and algorithmic levels. Recently, 
however, contributions from other research paradigms 
have gained relevance. In face recognition tasks, for 
example, the use of deep convolutional neural networks 
allows electronic computers, after intensive training and 
corrections, to recognize faces just like human beings do 
(Kriegeskorte, 2015).
To date, the investigation of measurement tasks has 
proven the most fruitful for understanding the functioning 
of the nervous system, which is largely due to a greater 
tangibility of the problem. It is considerably easier to 
isolate the variables that allow a relevant analysis of how 
the visual system processes light levels and contrast than 
it is to isolate the variables that allow the human being, 
through multimodal computations of the nervous system, 
to perform the task of seeing an object and correctly 
pronouncing its name (Baars, 2002; Cavanagh, 2011; 
Pylyshyn, 1999).
The parameters of inference and measurement 
seem thus to characterize visual computations sufficiently, 
at least in its early stages. As in the case of vision, 
certain parameters can be found to encompass, jointly, a 
specific cognitive process at all three levels. There are in 
principle no restrictions to the use of the same concepts 
in the description of other cognitive processes. Indeed, 
measurement and inference are associated with studies 
on the statistical properties of neuronal computations 
which, whether for a neuron or for the whole organism, 
seem to use probabilities and expectations to respond to 
particular stimuli and, therefore, guide behavior (Geisler, 
2008; Rao, Olshausen, & Lewicki, 2002). In this sense, 
Bayesian statistics provide a solid quantitative theory to 
these studies and, due to these probabilistic components 
and the constant update of expectations, the term ‘Bayesian 
brain’ is used to name studies that seek statistical properties 
in neuronal computation (Doya, 2007; Friston, 2012; 
Knill & Pouget, 2004).
Thus, the topics outlined in this section exemplify 
how the visual system has played a pioneering role in 
the multidisciplinary integration within neurosciences 
and cognitive sciences. In the study of vision, the three 
levels of Marr are consolidated, and interaction among 
them is encouraged. For the great theoretical problems 
in the field of psychology, this is a fruitful example of 
multidisciplinary integration.
Final considerations
In this article, we sought to present a theoretical 
scenario whose purpose is to outline and converge, in 
an organized manner, several ways to study cognitive 
processes. This is of outmost importance in the field of 
psychology, since its research lines may benefit from the 
knowledge generated by researchers from different fields 
of neurosciences and cognitive sciences.
In this sense, we presented the concept of 
information processing, which has become a central factor 
in the study of cognition since the so-called cognitive turn 
of the 20th century (Miller, 2003; Neisser, 1967). We also 
introduced the ideas of ecological perception (Gibson, 
1986; Neisser, 1967; Pinker, 1985) and embodied cognition 
(Anderson, 2003; Varela et al., 1991; Wilson & Foglia, 
2015), currents that postulate interdependence among 
perception, body, and environment. After introducing these 
concepts, and based on Marr’s theory, we discussed that 
it is possible to correlate the functioning of the nervous 
system with that of a computer, which is nothing more 
than a physical entity that processes information about the 
environment. Although computer performance is limited 
to specific conditions and not as versatile or adaptable as 
the vertebrate nervous system, the analogy still supports 
its validity for the analysis of cognitive processes.
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We believe that the complexity of human 
cognition remains intangible in many ways. However, 
the structured study of computational mechanisms 
of cognition, based on neurons and their circuits, 
helps understand how cognitive processes occur in 
the nervous system, albeit in an incipient way. Such 
knowledge has immediate practical implications, 
one of the most important being the consistency in 
diagnosing mental disorders (Williams, 2016). Also, 
understanding the nervous system as a complex 
system that quickly performs difficult tasks weakens 
an old research paradigm that considers the brain 
as a conglomerate of neurotransmitters, due to the 
lack of technologies to study the functioning of the 
brain in action (Fenno, Yizhar, & Deisseroth, 2011; 
Tye & Deisseroth, 2012). Hence, it is not solely the 
concentration and location of neurotransmitters that 
affects cognitive processes, but rather a complex range 
of computations in which neurotransmitters are one 
of many modulatory factors.
Marr’s three levels of analysis (computational, 
algorithmic and implementational levels) highlight the 
place of different research lines in the study of information 
processing by the nervous system, and can be used in the 
study of cognition. In a multidisciplinary context, it is 
very useful to structure the contribution from different 
knowledge areas. The levels of Marr have this purpose; 
the division into three levels is a way to study the 
nervous system, and not necessarily the way it is actually 
structured. In this light, the application of Marr’s levels 
should not be understood as a limiting prescription, but 
rather as a first approximation (for a discussion, refer to 
Coltheart, 2010; McClamrock, 1991). Our intention when 
writing this article was not to say that Marr’s levels are the 
only way in which a physiological system of information 
processing should be divided. Rather, we believe that 
this division, in many ways an arbitrary one, is a good 
approximation of complex systems such as the nervous 
system, and can provide a methodological structure that 
is useful in empirical research.
Although it is important to present and 
legitimize several research lines for the study of 
cognition, we emphasize that multidisciplinarity can 
only occur through their interaction. Therefore, even 
if there are characterizations at all three levels for a 
given cognitive process, it will only be satisfactorily 
described when a relation between them is made. To 
this end, cognitive psychology can play a vital role 
in this process of multidisciplinary convergence and 
theoretical consistency.
A neurociência computacional no estudo dos processos cognitivos
Resumo: Nas últimas décadas o estudo de processos cognitivos vem sendo influenciado por duas tendências: a legitimação de 
diversas formas e níveis de estudo e a tentativa de integração multidisciplinar. A primeira teve grande importância na segunda 
metade do século XX, quando linhas de pesquisa na psicologia cognitiva e nas neurociências fortaleceram-se. Nesse sentido, 
destacam-se os três níveis de Marr (computacional, algorítmico e implementacional) como forma de estruturar o estudo dos 
processos cognitivos. A segunda tendência é mais recente e busca, apoiada na primeira, aprofundar o entendimento dos 
processos cognitivos em suas diversas escalas e integrar diversos paradigmas de estudos, buscando consiliência teórica. O 
intento deste artigo é apresentar a neurociência computacional e suas possíveis contribuições para a psicologia cognitiva, 
articulando, por meio dos três níveis de Marr, uma base teórica que explicite o papel de cada uma das disciplinas e as suas 
possíveis interações.
Palavras-chave: cognição, neurociência computacional, memória, aprendizado, visão.
Neuroscience computationnelle dans l’étude des processus cognitifs
Résumé : Au long des dernières décennies, l’étude des processus cognitifs se voit influencé par deux tendances : la légitimation 
de plusieurs formes et niveaux d’études et l’essai d’intégration multidisciplinaire. La première a eu une grande importance 
pendant la deuxième moitié du XXe siècle, quand des lignes de recherche en psychologie cognitive et en neurosciences ont 
gagné force. Dans ce sens, on peut souligner les trois niveaux de Marr (computationnel, algorithmique et implémentationnel) 
comme moyens de structurer l’étude des procédés cognitifs. La deuxième tendance est plus récente et cherche, avec l’aide de la 
première, à approfondir la connaissance des procédés cognitifs et ses différentes échelles et à intégrer plusieurs modèles d’études, 
en cherchant des convergences théoriques. Le but de cet article est donc de présenter la neuroscience computationnelle et ses 
possibles contributions pour la psychologie cognitive en articulant, par les trois niveaux de Marr, une base théorique qui puisse 
expliciter le rôle de chacune des disciplines et de ses possibles interactions.
Mots-clés : cognition, neuroscience computationnelle, mémoire, apprentissage, vision.
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La neurociencia computacional en el estudio de los procesos cognitivos
Resumen: En las últimas décadas, el estudio de procesos cognitivos se ha visto influenciado por dos tendencias: la legitimación 
de diversas formas y niveles de estudio, y el intento de integración multidisciplinar. La primera tuvo gran importancia 
en la segunda mitad del siglo XX, cuando varias líneas de investigación en la psicología cognitiva y en las neurociencias se 
fortalecieron. En ese sentido, destacan los tres niveles de Marr (computacional, algorítmico e implementacional) como una 
manera de estructurar el estudio de los procesos cognitivos. La segunda tendencia es más reciente y busca, apoyada en la 
primera, profundizar la comprensión de los procesos cognitivos en sus diversas escalas e integrar diversos paradigmas de 
estudios, buscando consiliencia teórica. En este artículo, se intenta presentar la neurociencia computacional y sus posibles 
contribuciones para la psicología cognitiva, articulando, a través de los tres niveles de Marr, una base teórica que ponga de 
manifiesto el papel de cada una de las disciplinas y sus posibles interacciones.
Palabras clave: cognición, neurociencia computacional, memoria, aprendizaje, visión.
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